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Managing Price Uncertainty in Prosumer-Centric Energy Trading:
A Prospect-Theoretic Stackelberg Game Approach
Georges El Rahi, S. Rasoul Etesami, Walid Saad, Narayan Mandayam, and H. Vincent Poor
Abstract—In this paper, the problem of energy trading be-
tween smart grid prosumers, who can simultaneously consume
and produce energy, and a grid power company is studied.
The problem is formulated as a single-leader, multiple-follower
Stackelberg game between the power company and multiple
prosumers. In this game, the power company acts as a leader
who determines the pricing strategy that maximizes its profits,
while the prosumers act as followers who react by choosing the
amount of energy to buy or sell so as to optimize their current
and future profits. The proposed game accounts for each
prosumer’s subjective decision when faced with the uncertainty
of profits, induced by the random future price. In particular,
the framing effect, from the framework of prospect theory
(PT), is used to account for each prosumer’s valuation of its
gains and losses with respect to an individual utility reference
point. The reference point changes between prosumers and
stems from their past experience and future aspirations of
profits. The followers’ noncooperative game is shown to admit
a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) under classical
game theory (CGT) which is obtained using a fully distributed
algorithm. The results are extended to account for the case of
PT using algorithmic solutions that can achieve an NE under
certain conditions. Simulation results show that the total grid
load varies significantly with the prosumers’ reference point
and their loss-aversion level. In addition, it is shown that the
power company’s profits considerably decrease when it fails to
account for the prosumers’ subjective perceptions under PT.
I. INTRODUCTION
One key enabler of smart grid energy trading and man-
agement schemes is the presence of prosumers, i.e., smart
grid customers capable of generating and storing their own
energy. Indeed, the notable increase in penetration of solar
photovoltaic (PV) panels and storage devices at the prosumer
side of the grid will lead to novel demand-side energy
management (DSM) schemes that will help alleviate the
extremely expensive peak consumption hours and match
consumption demand to the intermittent renewable energy
supply of the grid [1].
A number of recent works [2]–[4] have studied the role of
storage devices in grid energy management. For example, the
authors in [2] propose a storage scheduling and management
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model, with the goal of minimizing peak hour consumption.
In [4], consumer-based storage scheduling is proposed in
an attempt to match energy consumption to the expected
power output of a central wind generation unit. In addition,
the work in [3] studies the topic of optimal offerings for
wind power generators, through the application of a common
storage device. Moreover, the work in [5] adopts a stochas-
tic optimization and robust optimization approach to study
demand response for residential appliances under uncertain
real-time prices.
Game-theoretic methods have been widely applied in the
existing DSM literature, given the coupled interactions be-
tween prosumers as discussed in [4], [6]–[10]. For instance,
the authors in [6] propose a load scheduling technique with a
dynamic pricing strategy related to the total consumption of
the grid. More particularly, a number of works [7]–[10] have
used the framework of Stackelberg games in order to study
the hierarchical interactions between the power company and
the grid’s consumers. For example, the authors in [7] propose
a Stackelberg game approach to deal with demand response
scheduling under load uncertainty based on real-time pricing
in a residential grid. Similarly, the authors in [8] and [10] use
a Stackelberg game approach between one power company
and multiple users, competing to maximize their profits,
with the goal of flattening the aggregate load curve. On the
other hand, the authors in [9] propose a Stackelberg game
approach between company and consumers, while studying
the impact that a malicious attacker could have, through
the manipulation of pricing data. In addition, the works in
[11] and [12] have used a Stackelberg game approach to
characterize the demand response of consumers with respect
to the retail price. In particular, the authors adopted stochastic
and robust optimization methods to study energy trading with
uncertain market prices. Moreover, a Stackelberg game for
energy sharing management of microgrids with photovoltaic
prosumers has been proposed in [13].
The main drawback of these works [4], [6]–[13] is the
assumption that consumers are fully rational and will thus
choose their strategy in accordance to classical game theory
(CGT). In practice, as observed by behavioral experimental
studies [14], human players can significantly deviate from the
rational principles of CGT, when faced with the uncertainty
of probabilistic outcomes. In this regard, the framework
of prospect theory (PT) [14] has been extensively applied
to model the irrational behavior of real-life individuals in
an uncertain decision making scenario [15]. In fact, the
authors in [16] and [17] discuss a storage management
framework where the owner can choose to store or sell
energy, while accounting for its subjective perceptions, using
a PT framework. In [18], a PT framework is used for DSM to
identify optimal customer participation time. However, these
works [16], [18], [19] do not typically study the conflicting
hierarchical interaction between the prosumers and the power
company and instead focus on the consumer side of the
grid. These works also fail to account for the uncertainty
associated with variable or dynamic pricing, which is ex-
pected to play a major role in DSM [1]. Even though the
combination of Stackelberg games and PT has been applied
in other research fields including wireless communication
[20], [21], security games [22], [23], and transport theory
[24], such combination has not been addressed in demand-
side energy management problems and from an algorithmic
perspective. In particular, these earlier works mainly focus
on the weighting effect of PT while here, we consider the
framing effect.
A. Contributions
The main contribution of this paper is a novel hierarchical
framework for optimizing energy trading between prosumers
and a grid power company, while explicitly taking into
account the uncertainty of the future energy price. Our work
differs from most of the existing literature on energy trading
[2]–[13], [16]–[24] in several aspects: 1) It models the
behavior of prosumers who can both generate and consume
energy under price uncertainty and using a Stackelberg game,
2) It provides a simple distributed algorithm with polynomial
convergence rate to the unique Stackelberg equilibrium point,
and 3) It captures the subjective decision making behavior
of the prosumers using framing effect in PT.
In particular, we formulate a single-leader, multiple-
follower Stackelberg game, in which the power company,
acts as a leader who declares its pricing strategy in or-
der to maximize its profits, to which prosumers, acting as
followers, react by choosing their optimal energy bid. We
define a prosumer’s utility function that captures the profits
resulting from buying/selling energy at the current known
price, as well as the uncertain future profits, originating
from selling stored energy. In contrast to CGT, we develop a
PT framework that models the behavior of prosumers when
faced with the uncertainty of future profits. In particular, we
account for each prosumer’s valuation of its gains and losses,
compared to its own individual utility evaluation perspective,
as captured via PT’s framing effect [14], by introducing
a utility reference point. This reference point represents a
prosumer’s anticipated profits and originates from previous
energy trading transactions and future aspirations of profits,
which can differ in between prosumers [15]. We show
that, under CGT, the followers’ noncooperative game admits
a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE). Moreover,
under PT, we derive a set of conditions under which the
pure strategy NE is shown to exist. In particular, we propose
distributed algorithms that allow the prosumers and power
company to reach an equilibrium under both CGT and PT.
Simulation results show that the total grid load, under PT,
decreases for certain ranges of prosumers’ reference points
and increases for others, when compared to CGT. The results
also highlight the impact of this variation on the power
company’s profits, which significantly decrease, when it fails
to account for the prosumers’ subjective perceptions under
PT.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the system model and formulates the Stackelberg
game model. In section III, we present the game solution
under CGT and provide a distributed algorithm which can
quickly reach the Stackelberg solution of the game. We
extend our results to games under PT in Section IV. Section
V presents our simulation results, and finally conclusions are
drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the set N of N grid prosumers. Each prosumer
n ∈ N owns an energy storage unit of capacity Qmax,n, and
a solar PV panel which produces a daily amount of energy
Wn. Each prosumer has a known load profile Ln that must
be satisfied and an initial stored energy Qn available in a
storage device, originating from an excess of energy at a
previous time.
In our model, the power company requires prosumers
to declare the amount of energy that they will be buying
or selling at the start of the period as done in day-ahead
scheduling models used in DSM literature such as in [4] and
[6]. We let xn be the amount of energy declared by prosumer
n, where xn > 0 implies an amount of energy that will be
bought and xn < 0 will represent the amount of energy that
will be sold. xn = 0 indicates that no energy is traded.
The price of selling or buying one unit of energy is related
to the total energy declared by all prosumers. In our pricing
model, each prosumer is billed based on the amount that
is declared. We assume that the prosumers are truthful and
have no incentive to deviate, given the possible penalties that
will be incurred. Next, as done in [18], [25], and [26], we
choose a so-called fairness pricing for buying/selling energy
which is proportional to the prosumers’ aggregate demand
and given by:
ρ (xn,x−n) = ρbase + α
∑
n∈N
xn, (1)
where ρbase and α are design parameters set by the power
company. For simplicity, we assume that α is fixed and
positive, and that the company only varies ρbase to control the
amount of energy bough/sold by the prosumers.1 In (1), x−n
is a vector that represents the amount of energy declared by
all the prosumers in the set N \ {n}. The price of unit of
energy ρ is regulated and must be within a range [ρmin, ρmax].
Here, we assume that the structure of this pricing function
is pre-determined by the utility company and announced a
priori to all the prosumers. This function is chosen based on
1Note that in this function we can also allow the utility company to adjust
α. While this does change our analysis from the prosumers’ perspective,
however, it gives an extra freedom for the utility company to maximize its
utility at a cost of solving a more complex optimization problem.
the idea that a higher aggregate demand by the prosumers
must naturally increase the energy prices.
The future price of energy is perceived to be unknown
by the prosumers, given the uncertainty related to future
solar energy generation and the pricing strategy of the power
company. The future price of energy is thus modeled by
a random variable ρf . For simplicity, we assume that ρf
follows a uniform distribution [ρmin, ρmax]. However, most of
our analysis can be extended to the case in which ρf follows
more general distributions.
The set of possible values of xn for each prosumer n is
Xn = {xn ∈ R : xn,min ≤ xn ≤ xn,max}. xn,min = −Wn −
Qn + Ln is a prosumer’s maximum sold/minimum bought
energy. xn,max = −Wn−Qn+Ln+Qmax,n, is the maximum
energy that prosumer n can purchase. For a chosen energy
bid xn, the prosumer’s utility function will be:
Un (xn,x−n, ρbase) = −
(
ρbase + α(xn +
∑
m∈N\n
xm)
)
xn
+ (Wn +Qn − Ln + xn) ρf .
(2)
In (2), the first term represents the revenue/cost of prosumer
n at the current time, while the second term represents
the future monetary value associated with unsold energy. In
particular, Wn + Qn − Ln + xn is the amount of energy
that prosumer n will have in its storage in the future.
The prosumers’ actions are coupled through the energy
price and they will thus be competing to maximize their
respective revenues. On the other hand, the power company
will purchase (sell) the energy bough (sold) by the prosumers
in the energy market at the current market clearing price ρmar.
Given the current market price, the power company’s utility
function is given by:
Upc(x, ρbase) =
(
ρbase + α
∑
n∈N
xn
) ∑
n∈N
xn − ρmar
∑
n∈N
xn,
(3)
where the first term represents the revenue that the utility
company earns by selling (buying)
∑
n xn energy units to
prosumers at the price of ρbase+α
∑
n xn, while the second
term is the cost of purchasing
∑
n xn energy units at the
clearing price of ρmar from the energy market.
The power company’s revenues are clearly affected by
the prosumers and their energy bids. On the other hand,
since the prosumers react to the power company’s choice
of ρbase, the prosumers’ utility is directly affected by the
power company’s action. We thus model the energy trading
problem as a hierarchical Stackelberg game [27] with the
power company acting as leader, and the prosumers acting
as followers.
A. Stackelberg game formulation
We formulate a single-leader, multiple-follower Stack-
elberg game [27], between the power company and the
prosumers. The power company (leader), will act first by
choosing ρbase to maximize its profits. The prosumers, having
received the power company’s pricing strategy, will engage
in a noncooperative game. In fact, the final price of energy is
proportional to the grid’s total load, to which each prosumer
contributes. We first formulate the prosumers’ problem under
CGT as follows:
max
xn
UCGTn (x, ρbase) :=Eρf [Un (xn,x−n, ρbase)] (4)
s.t xn ∈ [xmin,n, xmax,n] .
In (4), prosumer n attempts to maximize its expected
profits, given the actions of other prosumers and the power
company. The previous formulation assumes all prosumers to
be rational expected utility maximizers. Moreover, the power
company’s problem will be:
max
ρbase
Upc(x, ρbase), s.t ρbase ∈ [ρmin, ρmax] . (5)
To solve this game, one suitable concept is that of a Stackel-
berg equilibrium (SE) as the game-theoretic solution of our
model.
Definition 1. A strategy profile (x∗, ρ∗base) is a Stackelberg
equilibrium if it satisfies the following conditions:
UCGTn (x
∗
n,x
∗
−n, ρ
∗
base) ≥ UCGTn (xn,x∗−n, ρ∗base) ∀n ∈ N ,
min
x
∗
Upc(x
∗, ρ∗base) = max
ρbase
min
x
∗
Upc(x
∗, ρbase), (6)
where x∗n is the solution to problem (4) for all prosumers in
N , and ρ∗base is the solution to problem (5).
Remark 1. Note that in Definition 1, in the case where
the followers’ problem admits a unique solution x∗,
the second condition in (6) reduces to Upc(x
∗, ρ∗base) =
maxρbase Upc(x
∗, ρbase).
It is worth noting that our Stackelberg formulation is based
on a static game. However, our solution to this problem is
based on the notion of a repeated game approach in which
the prosumers frequently interact with the utility company in
order to find their equilibrium strategies. This is practically
important as it is a step toward analyzing more complex
senarios in which the smart grid’s environment dynamically
changes from one time instant to the other. For instance, one
can consider a multi-stage game where for each prosumer
n, Wn and Ln dynamically vary with time t, while Qn is
affected by Wn, Ln, and action xn taken at previous and
current times. As such, to capture this dynamic nature, our
proposed static game model can be expanded to a dynamic
stochastic game [28]–[30] with transition equations describ-
ing the evolution of the states, corresponding to Wn(t),
Ln(t), and Qn(t), with respect to time depending on the
control inputs x(t) := [x1(t), ..., xn(t)] and previous states.
In this case, the state of the game at time t consists of
Wn(t), Ln(t), and Qn(t) for prosumer n at stage t. The
chosen optimal action by each player at time t, i.e. control
inputs, would depend on the state at which the game is. In
this respect, our static game analysis here provides analytical
and algorithmic solution approaches through which optimal
strategies, for the prosumers and energy company, can be
obtained at the stationary states of the stochastic game.2
In other words, our repeated single stage game analysis
can be viewed as a solution to the multi-stage stochastic
game which has reached its stationary condition (i.e., at the
stationary state, it appears as if one is repeatedly playing the
same stationary game). In particular, the optimal stationary
strategies can be extracted from our static game analysis
under the stationarity condition.
III. GAME SOLUTION UNDER CGT
The analysis under CGT assumes that all prosumers are
expected utility maximizers. Thus, we seek to find a solution
that solves both problems (4) and (5), while satisfying
(6). First, we start by solving the follower’s problem while
assuming the the leader’s action is fixed to ρbase. We now
introduce the following notations:
θ := ρbase − ρmax + ρmin
2
, x¯−n :=
∑
k 6=n
xk,
δn := (Wn +Qn − Ln)ρmax + ρmin
2
, n ∈ N .
Here, the expected utility of prosumer n ∈ N will be:
UCGTn (xn, x¯−n, ρbase) = −αx2n − (θ + αx¯−n)xn + δn.
(7)
Next, we denote by xrn the best response of player n,
which is the solution of problem (4), given that all the other
players choose a specific strategy profile x−n. The following
theorem explicitly characterizes the best response of each
prosumer n.
Theorem 1. The best response of player n is given by:
xrn(x¯−n) =


− θ2α − x¯−n2 if − θ2α − x¯−n2 ∈ [xn,min, xn,max],
xn,min if − θ2α − x¯−n2 ≤ xn,min,
xn,max else.
(8)
Proof. See Appendix I.
In fact, one can rewrite the best responses of all the players
in Theorem 1 in a combined single matrix form. We define
A to be an n× n matrix with all entries equal to - 12 except
the diagonal entries which are 0, i.e., Aij = − 12 if j 6= i, and
Aij = 0, otherwise. Let a = − θ2α1 where 1 is the vector of
all 1’s. Then, we can rewrite (8) for all players as
xr = ΠΩ
[
a+Ax
]
, (9)
where ΠΩ[·] is the projection operator on the n dimensional
cube Ω :=
∏
n∈N
[xn,min, xn,max] in R
n. Our analysis will
later use this closed-form representation of the best response
dynamics.
2In a stochastic game framework, a stationary strategy consists of
obtaining the optimal strategy for a certain state regardless of the history
of the game or the particular time instant at which the game is played.
Algorithm 1 The relaxation learning algorithm
Given that at time step t = 1, 2, . . . players have requested
(x1(t), . . . , xn(t)) units of energy, at the next time step player n ∈ N
requests xn(t + 1) energy units given by
xn(t+ 1) = (1− 1√
t
)xn(t) +
1√
t
xrn(t),
where xrn(t) denotes the best response of player n, given the actions of
all other players x−n(t) at time step t.
A. Existence and uniqueness of the followers’ NE under
CGT
One key question with regard to the prosumers’ game is
whether such a game admits a pure-strategy NE. This is
important as it allows us to stabilize the demand market in an
equilibrium where each prosumer is satisfied with its payoff,
as shown next.
Theorem 2. The prosumers’ game admits a unique pure-
strategy NE.
Proof. See Appendix II.
B. Distributed learning of the followers NE
Next, we propose a distributed learning algorithm which
converges in a polynomial rate to the unique pure-strategy
NE of the prosumers’ game as formally stated in Algorithm
1. At each stage of Algorithm 1, prosumer n selects its next
action as a convex combination of its current action and its
best response at that stage. One of the main advantages of
Algorithm 1 is that it can be implemented in a completely
distributed manner as each prosumer needs only to know
its own actions and best response function, and does not
require any information about others’ actions. Moreover, the
prosumers do not need to keep track of their actions history
which is the case in many other learning algorithms. Note
that Algorithm 1 can be viewed as a special case of more
general algorithms known as relaxation algorithms [31].
The idea behind Algorithm 1 is that each player initially
puts more weight on its best response in order to explore
faster other possible actions with better payoffs. As the
time elapses, the prosumers’ actions become closer to their
optimal actions and, hence, the prosumers exploit their
current actions by putting more weight on their own actions.
While the exploration coefficient 1√
t
can be replaced by other
possible coefficients, we have chosen 1√
t
to optimize the
speed of convergence. Finally, note that the implementation
of Algorithm 1 is made possible by a bidirectional com-
munication between the power company and the prosumers,
provided by the smart meters. In fact, at each iteration, the
prosumer would send the power company its current strategy,
and would receive the updated energy price.
Next, we consider the following definition which will be
handy in proving our main convergence result in this section:
Definition 2. Given an n players game with utility functions
{un(·)}n∈N and any two action profiles x and y, the
Nikaido-Isoda function associated with this game is given
by Ψ(x,y) :=
∑
n∈N [un(yn, x−n)− un(xn, x−n)].
The Nikaido-Isoda function measures the social income
due to selfish deviation of individuals. This function admits
several key properties. As an example we always have
Ψ(x,x) = 0, ∀x. Moreover, given a fixed action profile x,
Ψ(x,y) is maximized when yn, equals the best response
of player n with respect to x−n. In particular, for such a
best response action profile y, Ψ(x,y) = 0 if and only if x
is a pure strategy NE of the game. While the Nikaido-Isoda
function has been used earlier to prove convergence of certain
dynamics to their equilibrium points [31], [32], however it
usually fails to provide an explicit convergence rate. In the
following theorem we leverage the Nikaido-Isoda function
associated to the prosumers’ game to measure the distance
of outputs of Algorithm 1 from the Nash equilibrium, and
hence obtain an explicit bound on the convergence rate of
this algorithm.
Theorem 3. If every prosumer updates its energy request
bid based on Algorithm 1, then their action profiles will
jointly converge to an pure strategy NE. After t steps the
joint actions will be an ǫ-NE where ǫ = O(t−
1
4 ) (i.e., the
convergence rate to an NE is O(t−
1
4 )).
Proof. See Appendix IV.
As it has been shown in Appendix II, the prosumers’ game
is a concave game [33], which is known to admit a distributed
learning algorithm for obtaining its NE points (see, e.g.,
[33, Theorem 10]). However, in general obtaining distributed
learning algorithms with provably fast convergence rates to
NE points in concave games is a challenging task. Therefore,
one of the main advantages of Theorem 3 is that it establishes
a polynomial convergence rate for the relaxation Algorithm 1
leveraging rich structure of the prosumers’ utility functions.
Remark 2. In fact, one of the advantages of our formulation
compared to similar models such as [12] is its computa-
tional tractability as it admits polynomial time distributed
algorithms for finding its equilibrium points, regardless of
the number of players in the game (Theorem 3).
C. Finding the Stackelberg Nash equilibrium under CGT
While Algorithm 1 achieves a unique pure strategy for the
prosumers’ game under CGT, our final goal is to obtain the
Stackelberg equilibrium of the entire game. For this purpose,
we leverage Algorithm 1 using one of the following methods
to construct the SE of the entire market under CGT:
1) Method 1: The Stackelberg equilibrium of the game
can be found by solving the following non-linear optimiza-
tion problem. Let x∗(ρbase) be the unique NE obtained by
the followers when the power company’s action is ρbase. Note
that x∗(ρbase) is a well-defined continuous function of ρbase.
First, the power company solves the following optimization
problem a priori to find its unique optimal action ρ∗base and
announces it to the prosumers. The problem is defined as:
max
ρbase
Upc(x
∗(ρbase), ρbase)
s.t. x∗(ρbase) = ΠΩ[a+Ax∗(ρbase)]. (10)
In fact, one can characterize the unique pure-strategy NE
of the prosumers’ game given in (10) in more detail. Since
at equilibrium every player must play its best response in
(9), therefore, an action profile x∗ is an equilibrium if and
only if we have x∗ = ΠΩ[a + Ax∗], which means x∗ =
argmin‖z − (a + Ax∗)‖2, z ∈ Ω . Since the former is a
convex optimization problem, we can write its dual as
max D(µ,ν) := −1
4
‖µ− ν‖2+(µ− ν)′(a+Ax∗)−µ′1
µ,ν ≥ 0,
where µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) and ν = (ν1, . . . , νn) are the dual
variables corresponding to the constraints zn ≤ xn,max and
zn ≥ xn,min, respectively. We denote the optimal solution
of the dual by (µ∗,ν∗). Since, we already know that x∗
is the optimal solution of the primal, due to the strong
duality the values of the primal and dual must be the same,
i.e., D(µ∗,ν∗) = ‖(I −A)x∗ − a‖2. Moreover, the KKT
conditions must hold at the optimal solution [34], which,
together with D(µ∗,ν∗) = ‖(I − A)x∗ − a‖2 provide
the following system of 3n equations with 3n variables
(x∗,µ∗,ν∗) which characterizes the equilibrium point x∗n
using dual variables:
D(µ∗,ν∗) = ‖(I −A)x∗ − a‖2,
µ∗n(x
∗
n − xmax,n) = 0,
ν∗n(x
∗
n − xmin,n) = 0, ∀n ∈ N . (11)
Solving these equations can be used to derive the unique
pure-strategy NE of the followers’ game.
We next present a second method, which does not require
the power company to solve the non-linear inequalities in
(11). In addition, the second method allows the players to
reach the SE quickly and efficiently in 1/ǫ5 steps and will
be mainly used in our simulation results in Section V.
2) Method 2: Given any small ǫ > 0 for which the power
company and the prosumers want to find their ǫ-SE with
precision ǫ (i.e., no one can gain more than ǫ by deviating),
the company partitions its action interval and sequentially
announces prices ρbase = kǫ, k = 1, . . . , ⌊ 1ǫ ⌋. For each such
price ρbase, prosumers obtain their ǫ-equilibrium in no more
than 1
ǫ4
steps, and the company must repeat this process at
most 1
ǫ
steps and choose the action that maximized its utility.
The running time in this case will be 1
ǫ5
to find an ǫ-SE.
Our analysis thus far assumed that all prosumers are
fully rational and their behavior can thus be modeled using
CGT. However, this assumption might not hold , given
that prosumer are humans that can have different subjective
valuations on their uncertain energy trading payoffs. Next,
we extend our result using PT [14] to model the behavior
of prosumers when faced with the unknown future price of
energy and thus the actual value of the stored energy.
IV. PROSPECT THEORETIC ANALYSIS
In a classical game-theoretic framework, an individual
evaluates an objective expected utility. However, in a real-life
setting, empirical studies [14], have shown that decision mak-
ers, tend to deviate noticeably from the rationality axioms,
UPTn (xn, x¯−n, ρbase) =


(cρmax + d− Rn)β++1 − (cρmin + d− Rn)β++1
c(β+ + 1)ρd
, if Rn < ρminc+ d,
(cρmax + d− Rn)β++1
c(β+ + 1)ρd
− λn (−cρmin − d + Rn)
β−+1
c(β− + 1)ρd
, if ρminc + d < Rn < ρmaxc + d,
λn(−cρmax − d + Rn)β−+1 − λn(−cρmin − d + Rn)β−+1
c(β− + 1)ρd
, if ρmaxc + d < Rn.
(12)
when subjected to uncertain payoffs. The most prominent
of such studies was that done by Kahneman and Tversky
within the context of prospect theory [14], which won the
2002 Nobel prize in economic sciences.
The utility framing notion is one of the two main tenets
of prospect theory. As observed in real-life experimental
studies, utility framing states that each individual perceives
a utility as either a loss or a gain, after comparing it to its
individual reference point [14]. The reference point is typi-
cally different for each individual and originates from its past
experiences and future aspirations of profits. Furthermore,
individuals tend to evaluate losses in a very different manner
compared to gains. The main axioms of utility framing are
summarized as follows:
• Individuals perceive utility according to changes in
value with respect to a reference point rather than an
absolute value.
• Individuals assign a higher value to differences between
small gains or losses close to the reference point in
comparison to those further away. Te effect is referred
to as diminishing sensitivity, and is captured by the
coefficients β+ and β−.
• Individuals feel greater aggravation for losing a sum
of money than satisfaction associated with gaining the
same amount of money. This phenomenon is referred
to as loss aversion and is captured by the aversion
coefficient λ.
It is worth noting that PT differs from other risk mea-
sures such as Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) [35] which
evaluates the market risk based on the expected value of
the risk at some future time. The underlying assumption in
evaluating CVaR is that the risk is measured based on the
conventional expectation of the future uncertain price, while
in PT, the expectation is replace by subjective perception of
the individuals which up to some extent introduces a notion
of bounded rationality into the model.
A. Energy Trading Analysis through Utility Framing
In our model, a prosumer’s uncertainty originates from
the unknown future energy price and power company pricing
strategy. Consequently, we will analyze the effect of the key
notion of utility framing from PT. Utility framing states that
a utility is considered a gain if it is larger than the reference
point, while it is perceived as a loss if it is smaller than
that reference point. This reference captures a prosumer’s
anticipated profits and originates from past energy trading
transactions and future aspirations of profits, which can differ
in between different prosumers [15]. Let Rn be the reference
point of a given prosumer n. Thus, to capture such subjective
perceptions, we use PT framing [15] to redefine the utility
function:
V (Un (x, ρbase))=
{
(Un(x, ρbase)−Rn)β
+
if Un(x, ρbase)>Rn,
−λn (Rn−Un(x, ρbase)β
−
if Un(x, ρbase)<Rn,
(13)
where β−, β+ ∈ (0, 1] and λ ≥ 1. V (·) is a framing value
function, concave in gains and convex in losses with a larger
slope for losses than for gains [15]. The expected utility
function of prosumer n under PT, for a given action profile
x, is given by (12) where c := Wn + Qn + xn − Ln,
d := − (ρbase + α(xn + x¯−n))xn, and ρd := ρmax − ρmin.
B. Existence and uniqueness of the NE under PT
To study the existence of the followers’ NE under PT, we
analyze the concavity of the utility function in (12). The
concavity of the PT utility function provides a sufficient
condition to conclude the existence of at least one pure-
strategy NE [33, Theorem 1]. Here, we note that prosumer
n’s expected utility function can take multiple forms over
the product action space Ω, depending on the conditions
in (12). It is thus challenging to prove that the utility
function is concave, which makes it extremely difficult to
analyze the existence and uniqueness of the followers’ NE.
Thus, we inspect a number of conditions under which the
PT utility function is concave. Here, for simplicity and
to provide more closed-form solutions, we disregard the
diminishing sensitivity effect and thus set β+ = β− = 1.
The following theorem provides sufficient conditions under
which the prosumers’ game under PT admits a pure NE.
Theorem 4. In either of the following cases, the prosumers’
game under PT admits at least one pure strategy NE:
• Case 1: ∆1 > 0, and xr1 < xn,min, xn,max < xr2.
• Case 2: ∆2 < 0, or xn,max < xr3, or xr4 < xn,min.
• Case 3: (∆2 > 0, xr3 < xn,min, xn,max < xr4), and
(∆1 < 0, or xn,max < xr1 or xr2 < xn,min), and(
xmax,n < 1− b1a1
)
,
where
kn := Wn +Qn − Ln,
∆1 := (ρmin − ρbase − αx¯−n)2 + 4α(knρmin −Rn),
∆2 := (ρmax − ρbase − αx¯−n)2 + 4α(knρmax −Rn),
xr1,r2 :=
±√∆1 + (ρmin − ρbase − αx¯−n)
2α
,
xr3,r4 :=
±√∆2 + (ρmax − ρbase − αx¯−n)
2α
,
m1 := 64(Wn +Qn − Ln), a1 = 48α2(1− λn),
b := (176α2kn + 32α(ρbase − ρmax + αx¯−n))(1− λn).
Proof. See Appendix V.
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Fig. 1. Total grid load under expected utility theory and prospect theory.
As an immediate corollary of Theorem 4, under any of the
above conditions, one can again obtain the SE of the entire
market for PT prosumers using the same procedure used
under CGT (i.e., using Algorithm 1 in the prosumers’ side
together with either of the methods in Subsection III-C). This
is simply because, under any of the conditions in Theorem 4,
the prosumers’ game again becomes a concave game which
is sufficient for the convergence of Algorithm 1. It is worth
noting that, in general, using PT rather than CGT will change
the results pertaining to the existence of an NE (see e.g.,
[36]). However, Theorem 4 provides a sufficient condition
under which the same existence results derived for CGT still
hold under PT.
Finally, whenever the concavity of the game cannot be
guaranteed, we propose a sequential best response algorithm,
that build on our previous work in [37]. This is a special
case of Algorithm 1, where xn(t + 1) = x
r
n(t), and where
players update their strategy sequentially instead of simul-
taneously. An analytical proof of existence/convergence is
challenging, given that no proof for the game’s concavity
could be derived, as previously discussed. However, when
it converges, this algorithm is guaranteed to reach an NE.
In fact, as observed from our simulations in Section V, the
algorithm always converged and found a pure-strategy NE,
for all simulated scenarios.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For our simulations, we consider a smart grid with N = 9
prosumers, unless otherwise stated, each of which having a
load Ln arbitrarily chosen within the range [10, 30] kWh.
In addition, the storage capacity Qmax,n is set to 25 kWh
and α = 1/N . β+ and β− are taken to be both equal to
0.88 and λ = 2.25, unless stated otherwise [15]. We set,
ρbase = $0.04 and Rn = $1, unless stated otherwise. When
the leader’s action is not fixed, method 2 from Section III-C
was used to find the SE.
Fig. 1 compares the effect of different prosumer reference
points on the total energy sold or bought for both CGT and
PT, while fixing the power company’s action. For CGT, a
prosumer’s reference point is naturally irrelevant. For the PT
case, for a reference point below −$2, the prosumers’ action
profile is not significantly affected compared to CGT, since
most potential payoffs of the action profile are still viewed
as gains, above the reference point. As the reference point
increases from −$2 to $0.5, the total energy consumed will
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Fig. 2. Effect of varying the loss multiplier λ.
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decrease from around 145 kWh to 130 kWh, since some
of the potential payoffs of the current action profile will
start to be perceived as losses, as they cross the reference
point. Given that losses have a larger weight under PT
compared to CGT, the expected utility of the current strategy
profile will significantly decrease thus causing the followers
to exhibit a risk-averse behavior. In fact, as some of the
potential future profits are perceived as losses, a prosumer
will sell more energy at the current time slot. As the reference
point increases from $0.5 to $2, the present profits are now
perceived as losses, and prosumers will start exhibiting risk-
seeking behavior. In fact, each prosumer will consider the
present profit as insignificant and will thus store more energy
in the hope of selling it in the future at higher prices.
Finally, as the reference point approaches $8, the effect of
uncertainty will gradually decrease, given that all profits are
now perceived as losses. We note that even a small difference
in perception ($1.5) caused the total grid load to shift from
145 kWh to 130 kWh. This highlights the importance of
behavioral analysis and prosumer subjectivity when assessing
the performance of dynamic pricing strategies.
Fig. 2 shows the effect of the loss multiplier λ on the total
energy purchased, for a fixed power company strategy. The
loss multiplier maps the loss aversion of prosumers when
assessing their utility outcomes. The effect of framing is
more prominent as the loss multiplier increases. For instance,
the prosumers will exhibit more risk averse behavior for a
reference point in the range of [−$0.5, $2.5]. As seen from
Fig. 2, as λ increase from 2 to 6, the total load would
decrease by up to 14%. In fact, to avoid the large losses,
the prosumers will decrease the energy they purchase at the
current risk free energy price.
Fig. 3 compares the company’s profits for the scenario in
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which the power company accounts for prosumer irrationality
to the scenario in which the power company assumes that
prosumers are rational. In both scenarios, the prosumers are
irrational. For a reference point below $1, the company’s
profits are barely affected. However, as the reference point
crosses $1, the company’s profits start to show a clear
decrease between the two scenarios. In fact, as the power
company is not accounting for the prosumer’s actual subjec-
tive behavior, its pricing strategy is no longer optimal. As
was seen in Fig. 1, this is the reference point range where
the total consumption mostly differs between CGT and PT.
The decrease in profits reaches a peak value of 15 % at
a reference point of $2. Clearly, the power company will
experience a decrease in profits, if it neglects the subjective
perception of prosumers.
Fig. 4 shows the total grid load energy consumption as
function of the number of prosumers. The figure highlights
the difference in consumption between rational prosumers
and subjective prosumers with Rn = $1, which increases
significantly with the number of prosumers in the grid. This
difference reaches 100 kWh for 50 prosumers. This high-
lights the impact of irrational behavior, which is prominent
for larger grids.
Fig. 5 shows the energy consumption of different groups
of prosumers, with different reference points, inside a single
grid. For a very small ρbase, the different groups have
equal consumption. As ρbase is increased to −5 cents, the
prosumers with Rn = $1 start to decrease their consumption
at equilibrium, while the other groups’ consumption remains
unchanged. This is similar to what was discussed in Fig 1,
where prosumers with reference points close to $1, exhibit
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risk averse behavior and thus lower energy consumption.
On the other hand, rational prosumers will start decreasing
their consumption at ρbase = 2 cents, while risk seeking
prosumers (Rn = $3) will start decreasing their consumption
at ρbase = 5 cents.
Fig. 6 shows the number of iterations needed for the
best response algorithm to converge to a followers’ NE
for different number of prosumers, under PT. Clearly, the
best response algorithm converges, for all these cases. In
addition, the number of iterations needed for convergence is
reasonable, even as the number of prosumers significantly
increases from 10 to 70.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel framework for
analyzing energy trading of prosumers with the power grid,
while accounting for the uncertainty of the future price of
energy. We have formulated the problem as a Stackelberg
game between the power company (leader), seeking to
maximize its profits by setting its optimal pricing strategy,
and multiple prosumer (followers), attempting to choose the
optimal amount of energy to trade. The prosumers game was
shown to have a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium under
classical game theoretic analysis. Subsequently, we have used
the novel concept of utility framing from prospect theory to
model the subjective behavior of prosumers when faced with
the uncertainty of future energy prices. Simulation results
have highlighted the impact of behavioral considerations on
the overall energy trading process.
As a future avenue of research, one can extend our model
to a more dynamic multi-stage game that not only utilizes
further capabilities of the storage devices (e.g. load shifting
over time periods), but also admits efficient algorithms for
obtaining its equilibrium points. In particular, devising in-
centive compatible mechanisms for our model in the form of
multi-stage dynamic game is an interesting future problem.
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APPENDIX I
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
First, we analyze the strictly concave expected utility of
prosumer n in (7). By taking the second derivative of (7)
with respect to xn, we get:
∂UEUTn
∂2xn
= −2α, which is a strictly
negative term, as α > 0. The optimal solution is either an
interior point obtained by solving the necessary and sufficient
optimality condition given by
∂UEUTn
∂xn
= 0, or is at one of
the boundaries, in case the interior solution is not feasible.
Solving the optimality solution gives a unique solution xrn =
− θ2α − x¯−n2 . xrn maximizes each prosumer’s expected utility
function given that it lies in the feasible range of Xn.
APPENDIX II
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
First, we show that the followers’ game is a concave game
with closed and convex action sets in which the utility of
player n is a concave function of its own action xn, for
any fixed actions of others x−n. From (7), one can see
that the utility function of each prosumer n is quadratic,
and thus concave, in terms of its own action variable xn.
Moreover, the action set of each prosumer Xn is clearly a
closed convex set. Using [33, Theorem 1], we can show that
the prosumers’ game admits at least one pure strategy NE.
For NE uniqueness, we use [33, Theorem 2] to show that the
prosumers game is diagonally strictly concave. This means
that one can find a fixed nonnegative vector r ≥ 0 such
that for every two action profiles xo, x˜ ∈ X1× · · ·×Xn,
(x˜−xo)′g(xo, r) + (xo− x˜)′g(x˜, r) > 0, where g(x, r) =
(r1∇x1UEUT1 (x), . . . , rn∇xnUEUTn (x))′. We let rj = 1 for
each j ∈ N . Using (7), we have
gj(x, r) = −2αxj + θ + αx¯−j , j ∈ N .
We let I be the identity matrix, and J be a square matrix with
all entries equal to 1. Then we can write g(x, r) =Kx+c,
whereK := −α(I+J).K is a negative definite matrix due
to the positive definiteness of I+J and the fact that −α < 0.
By checking the diagonally strict concavity condition we get
(x˜− xo)′g(x˜, r) + (xo − x˜)′g(xo, r)
= (x˜− xo)′[Kxo + c] + (xo − x˜)′[Kx˜+ c]
= −(x˜− xo)′K(x˜− xo) > 0, (14)
where the last inequality is due to the negative-definiteness
of the matrix K. Using [33, Theorem 2] the NE will be
unique.
APPENDIX III
AUXILILIARY LEMMA FOR THE PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Lemma 1. There exists a constant K > 0 for which the
Nikaido-Isoda function Ψ(x,y) associated with the pro-
sumers’ game satisfies Ψ(x,y) ≤ K‖x − y‖. Moreover,
Ψ(x,y) is convex in x and strongly concave in y such that
Ψ(x, λy˜ + (1− λ)yˆ) = λΨ(x, y˜) + (1− λ)Ψ(x, yˆ)
+ αλ(1− λ)‖yˆ − y˜‖2, ∀λ ∈ [0, 1].
(15)
Proof. For any two action profiles of the prosumers x =
(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Ω and y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Ω, the Nikaido-
Isoda function adopted for the utility in (7) will be:
Ψ(x,y) : =
∑
n∈N
[UEUTn (yn,x−n, ρbase)− UEUTn (xn,x−n, ρbase)]
=
∑
n∈N
[α(x2n − y2n) + (θ + αx¯−n)(xn − yn)].
(16)
Using (16), for any two action profiles x,y ∈ Ω, we have
Ψ(x,y) =
∑
n∈N
(xn − yn)[α(xn + yn) + θ + αx¯−n]
≤
√∑
n∈N
(xn−yn)2
√∑
n∈N
[α(xn+yn)+θ+αx¯−n]2
= ‖x− y‖
√∑
n∈N
[α(xn + yn) + θ + αx¯−n]2
≤ K‖x − y‖,
where the first inequality is due to the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality, and K :=
√
n(θ + α(n+ 1)Bmax)2 is an upper
bound constant for the second term of the last equality. To
show the convexity of Ψ(x,y) with respect to x, let J be
the n × n matrix with all entries equal to 1. Using (16), a
simple calculation shows that ∇2
xx
Ψ(x,y) = 2αJ , where
∇2
xx
Ψ(x,y) denotes the Hessian matrix of Ψ(x,y) with
respect to variable vector x. Since α > 0 and J is a positive
semi-definite matrix, this shows that ∇2
xx
Ψ(x,y) > 0,
which implies Ψ(x,y) is a convex function of x. Finally
using (7), one can easily check that the equality in (15) holds,
which shows that Ψ(x,y) is strongly concave with respect
to its second argument y.
APPENDIX IV
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
We show that limt→∞ x(t) = x∗, from Algorithm 1,
where x∗ is a pure-strategy NE for the prosumers. To show
that, we measure the distance of an action profile x(t) and
its best response ΠΩ
[
a + Ax(t)
]
using the Nikaido-Isoda
function and show that this distance decreases as t becomes
large. In particular, we show that at the limit, this distance
equals zero which shows that the limit point is an NE of the
game.
Ψ(x(t+1),xr(t+1)) = Ψ
(
(1− 1√
t
)x(t)+
xr(t)√
t
,x
r(t+1)
)
≤ (1− 1√
t
)Ψ
(
x(t),xr(t)
)
+
1√
t
Ψ
(
x
r(t),xr(t+ 1)
)
.
(17)
Using the first part of Lemma 1, we have
Ψ
(
x
r(t),xr(t+ 1)
)
≤ K‖xr(t)− xr(t+ 1)‖
= K‖ΠΩ
[
a+Ax(t)
]− ΠΩ[a+Ax(t+ 1)]‖
≤ K‖[a +Ax(t)]− [a +Ax(t+ 1)]‖
≤ K‖A‖‖x(t)− x(t+ 1)‖,
=
K(n− 1)
2
√
t
‖x(t)− xr(t)‖. (18)
where the first inequality is due to the nonexpansive property
of the projection operator, the second inequality uses the
matrix norm inequality, and the last equality is obtained by
replacing the expression for x(t + 1) and noting that the
induced 2-norm of matrix A equals n−12 . Substituting (18)
into (17) we have
Ψ
(
x(t+ 1),xr(t+ 1)
)
≤ (1− 1√
t
)Ψ
(
x(t),xr(t)
)
+
K(n− 1)
2t
‖x(t)− xr(t)‖.
Since Ψ(x(t),x(t)) = 0, we can write
Ψ
(
x(t+ 1),xr(t+ 1)
)
≤ (1− 1√
t
)Ψ(x(t),xr(t))
+
1√
t
Ψ(x(t),x(t)) +
K(n− 1)
2t
‖x(t)− xr(t)‖
= Ψ
(
x(t), (1− 1√
t
)xr(t) +
1√
t
x(t)
)
− α(1− 1√
t
)
1√
t
‖x(t)− xr(t)‖2+K(n− 1)
2t
‖x(t)− xr(t)‖
≤ Ψ(x(t),xr(t))− Ψ
2(x(t),xr(t))
2K2
α
√
t
+
K(n− 1)D
2t
,
where the first equality is due to Lemma 1, and the last
inequality is due to first part of Lemma 1 and the fact that
xr(t) maximizes Ψ(x(t), ·). Multiplying both sides of the
above inequality by α
2K2
√
t
and defining c := α(n−1)D4K and
at :=
α
2K2
√
t
Ψ(x(t),xr(t)), we get
at+1 ≤ at − a2t +
c
t
√
t
. (19)
Our goal is to show that at <
√
2c× t− 34 for all t ≥ 100
c2
,
in which case by definition of at we obtain Ψ(x(t),x
r(t)) =
O(t−
1
4 ). This not only shows that limt→∞Ψ(x(t),xr(t)) =
0, implying that {x(t)} converges to a pure strategy NE of
the prosumers game (note that Ψ(x,xr) = 0 if and only if
x is a NE), but it also shows that after t steps, the action
profile of the prosumers x(t) is an ǫ-NE of the game where
ǫ = O(t−
1
4 ) (this is due to Ψ(x(t),xr(t)) = O(t−
1
4 ) im-
plies Un(x
r
n(t),x−n(t), ρbase) − Un(xn(t),x−n(t), ρbase) =
O(t−
1
4 ) for all n ∈ N , meaning that given the action
profile x(t), no prosumer can increase its utility by more
that O(t−
1
4 ) by playing its best response).
We complete the proof using induction on t to show that
at <
√
2c×t− 34 . Assume that this relation is true for t. Then
at+1 ≤ at − a2t + c
t
√
t
≤
√
2ct−
3
4 − 2ct− 32 + c
t
√
t
=
√
2ct−
3
4 − ct− 32 .
Let f(z) : [1,∞) → R be a function defined by f(z) =√
2cz−
3
4 − √2c(z + 1)− 34 − cz− 32 . We only need to show
that f(z) < 0, for t ≥ 100
c2
. By writing the Taylor expansion
of the first two terms of f(z) for z ≥ 1, we have f(z) ≤
7
√
2cz−
7
4 − cz− 32 , which is less than 0 for t ≥ 100
c2
. This
completes the induction and shows that at = O(t
− 3
4 ).
APPENDIX V
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
We first find the conditions under which the expected
utility function is uniform over each prosumer’s action space.
We then find the additional condition to ensure that the
function is strictly concave.
Case 1: To have Rn < ρminc+ d, for all of prosumer n’s
actions, we first rewrite the inequality in terms of xn:
−αx2n + (ρmin − ρb − αx¯−n)xn + (ρminKn −Rn) < 0,
where kn =Wn +Qn−Ln. By analyzing the second order
polynomial, and its roots, r1 and r2, we get the condition for
case 1. Under such a condition, the expected utility function
of prosumer n under PT, simplifies to UPTn (xn, x¯−n, ρbase) =
UEUTn (xn, x¯−n, ρbase) − Rn. This is clearly a concave func-
tion, given that, UEUTn (xn, x¯−n, ρbase) has been shown to be
concave, and Rn is a constant.
Case 2: In order to have Rn > ρmaxc + d, for all
of prosumer n’s actions, we follow a similar approach in
order to find the condition for case 2. Under this con-
dition, the expected utility function under PT simplifies
to UPTn (xn, x¯−n, ρbase) = λ(U
EUT
n (xn, x¯−n, ρbase) − Rn),
which is also strictly concave, given that λ is strictly positive.
Case 3: To have ρminc + d < Rn < ρmaxc + d, for all
of prosumer n’s actions, we follow a similar approach in
order to find the condition for case 3. We next analyze the
concavity of the expected utility function, given in the second
line in (12). The second derivative is given by:
∂Un,PT
∂2xn
=
a1
m1
xn − a1m1 − bm1
m21
− (λ− 1)a
2
2
(Qn − Ln +Wn + xn)3 ,
where a2 = (Rn − (knρbase) + α(L2n + Q2n + w2n) −
2LnQnα+Lnαx¯−n−Qnαx¯−n−2Lnαwn+2Qnαwn. Note
that − (λ−1)a22(Qn−Ln+Wn+xn)3 is negative for all xn. Next, we find
the range of xn for which
a1
m1
xn− a1m1−b1m1m2
1
is negative as
well. Given that a1
m1
is negative, the utility function is thus
guaranteed to be concave for xn >
a1m1−b1m1
a1m1
.
